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I. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge of the history of conflict of laws in Nigeria, the ideas
behind its development, and the numerous problems that beset the
application of its principles, is in itself the history of the socio-economic
structure of the society, between feudalism and capitalism. Conflict of
laws often found more fertile soil for germination in societies with
capitalist tendencies, like the Italian city-states of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Its historical context identifies the themes that matter
in the development of laws in Nigeria.
In Egypt, Rome and the Greek city-states, citizens had dealings,
contacts and commercial intercourse with foreigners which ought to have
raised the question of conflict of laws in disputes arising from such
intermingling and transactions. The Egyptians traded with the Greeks; the
Romans traded with most parts of their world, e.g., the Carthaginians and
Europeans; and the Greek city-states traded among themselves and with
their neighbors. What was the law applied by the courts of each of these
ancient peoples in the settlement of disputes which had foreign elements?
It does not seem that clear choice of law rules as known today were
developed and applied by the courts of these ancient states. However, it
appears that disputes which arose from intercourse with foreigners were
settled in a peculiar manner by means of treaties and bilateral agreements'
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under which the application of the local legal system was extended to
foreigners. For instance, under the bilateral agreement between Rome
and Carthage, law applicable to Roman citizens alone, jus civile, was
extended to Carthaginians. In addition, Rome appointed a special
magistrate, the praetor peregrinus, to adjudicate disputes between Romans
and foreigners or between two foreigners in Rome. However, the praetor
peregrinus did not settle such disputes on the basis of rules analogous to
contemporary choice of law rules in conflict of laws, but relied on general
notions of fairness and justice. The body of law emanating from the
praetor peregrinus's decisions formed the part of Roman law known as jus
gentium.
But it was in the Italian city-states in the Middle Ages that a scientific
approach was adopted toward the solution of disputes arising from
transactions and intercourse with foreigners. They had separate courts,
laws and magistrates for that purpose. The city-states were legally and
politically independent and had huge trading transactions and intercourse
among themselves. A citizen of Bologna would conclude a contract in
Padua, with a citizen of Modena, to be performed in Florence. Such
transactions had contacts with four city-states whose laws were not
necessarily identical with respect to issues arising from the contract. The
question became, "what law was applicable to such disputes?" The Roman
jurists of this period, the glossators of whom Accursius is an example,
tried to answer such questions by means of glosses on the Justinian Code.
However, this approach was fictitious because that Code did not have
choice of law rules. 2
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1. RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXT BOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 65-66 (2d ed. 1940). P. VINOGRADOFF, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
PAUL VINOGRADOFF, VOL. II: JURISPRUDENCE 260-61 (1928).
2. A celebrated seventeenth century writer stated:
It often happens that transactions entered into in one place have force and effect in the
territories of a different state, or have to be adjudicated upon in another place.
Moreover, it is well known that the laws of every nation differ in many respects, for
since the breaking up of the provinces of the Roman Empire, Christendom has been
divided into almost innumerable nations, not subject to one another and not sharing the
same system of government. It is not surprising that there is nothing on the subject in
Roman law, for since the sovereignty of Rome extended to all parts of the world and
was regulated by a uniform law it could hardly give rise to a conflict of different laws.
ULRICH HUBER, DE CONFLICTu LEGUM DIVERSARUM IN DIVERSIS IMPERUS: PRAELECTIONES
1707, translated and reprinted in D.J. Llewelyn, The Influence of Huber's De Conflicu Legun on
English Private International Law, 1937 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 64-78.
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The post-glossators, e.g., Bartolus, approached the question of
applicable law engendered by intercourse with foreigners from the
perspective of statutory doctrine. A statute was used by the post-glossators
to refer to all laws of a city, whether the laws emanated from custom,
legislative enactment, or executive acts. 3  Under statutory doctrine, a
statute was real if things were mentioned first, and personal if persons
were mentioned first.' Real statutes applied to all things within the
territory of the sovereign who enacted the statute and had no force outside
the territory of that enacting sovereign. Personal statutes followed a
person everywhere and had force within and outside the territory of the
enacting sovereign. By this analysis, a court in Modena, for instance,
could apply the personal statute of Padua but not its real statute. It was
often a matter of great controversy whether a statute was real or personal.
Is a statute on conveyance of land to minors real because it mentions land,
or personal because it mentions persons?
This statutory doctrine approach continued in France in the sixteenth
century. France also had the problem of conflict of laws arising from its
diversity of regional laws, i.e., coutume, mainly written, which varied
from province to province and had to apply to inter-provincial trade. The
foremost exponents of the statutory doctrine in France were Charles
Dumoulin (1500-1566), who established the principle that the law mutually
intended by the parties, or presumed to have been intended by them,
should apply to disputes arising from their contract; and D'Argentre (1519-
1590), who added a third class of statute: mixed statutes, i.e., statutes that
mentioned both persons and things. He considered mixed statutes to be in
the nature of real statutes which did not have extra-territorial application.
This statutory doctrine-adopted in the Italian city-states, in France,
in Germany, and later in America by Samuel Livermore-bears close
resemblance to modem choice of law rules. Choice of law rules, e.g., lex
domicilii, lex contractus, and lex loci delicti, ensure that in certain
circumstances the court of a country could apply foreign law as providing
the rule of decision. Likewise, the statutory doctrine gave extra-territorial
effect to foreign law where such law was personal, as defined above. In
the same way that a modem court can hold that legitimation is governed by
lex domicilii, and therefore should apply foreign law if it is the law of
domicile, a court in Padua would apply the statute of Modena if it dealt
with the legitimation of Modena citizens, i.e., was a personal statute and
gave effect to it.
3. A. K. KUHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(1937).
4. BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 45-46 (J.H. Beale ed., 1914).
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However, the Dutch theorists in the seventeenth century, notably Paul
Voet (1619-1677), Ulrich Huber (1636-1694) and Johannes Voet (1647-
1714), did not base the solution for conflict of law problems on the
statutory doctrine. They resorted to the comity doctrine as the basis of
their solution to disputes arising from international transactions or
intercourse. The Netherlands, like France, were divided into independent
provinces with their own separate legal systems. Intercourse among these
provinces and between them and other countries ensured the emergence of
conflict of laws problems. The Dutch jurists tried to respond to such
problems on the basis of the comity doctrine, under which foreign law was
applied by reason of the comity or friendly relations existing between
nations., The implication seems to be that a Dutch province applied a
foreign law, e.g., English law, not on the basis of lucid choice of law rules
but solely on the ground of whether or not friendly relations existed
between the province and England. What happened when, for instance,
the relationship between it and England became frosty? Would English
law then be inapplicable? We know today that courts give recognition to
foreign law in order to obviate the injustice that would arise by doing the
contrary. When courts apply foreign law, it is not out of any courtesy or
respect to the foreign country. For instance, when a court holds that a
marriage celebrated in a foreign country would be determined, as to its
formal validity, by the foreign law, it so holds not because of any friendly
relationship or respect for that foreign country but because of the injustice
that might arise if the local law was applied to determine the validity of
that marriage. It could be that under the local law the marriage is formally
invalid, though formally valid by the foreign law under which it was
celebrated. The result could be that the children of the marriage might be
legitimate, i.e., by virtue of valid celebration of the parents' marriage
.5. Huber writes:
For the purpose of unfolding the difficulty of this particularly intricate subject we shall
formulate three maxims which, being accepted as undoubtedly it appears they should
be, seem to clear the way for us for the solution of the remaining questions. They are
these:
1. The laws of every sovereign authority have force within the boundaries of its state,
and bind all subject to it, but not beyond.
2. Those are held to be subject to a sovereign authority who are found within its
boundaries whether they be there permanently or temporarily.
3. Those who exercise sovereign authority so act from comity that the laws of each
nation having been applied within its own boundaries should retain their effect
everywhere so far as they do not prejudice the power or rights of another state or its
subjects.
HUBER, supra note 2.
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under the foreign law, but illegitimate under a local law which had no
connection with the celebration of the marriage in a foreign country.
The point is that in The Netherlands the comity doctrine was
employed in a way similar to the modem function of choice of law rules,
i.e., used as the basis for the application of a foreign law to a case having
a foreign element.
It was in England and America in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries that choice of law. rules as we know them today were developed
for conflict of laws. Instead of approaching the question of conflict of
laws from the perspectives of the statutory and comity doctrines, the judges
in these countries applied judicially developed rules of selection, i.e.,
choice of law rules, to such questions. For instance, in Holman v.
Johnson, Lord Mansfield observed:
There can be no doubt, but that every action tried here
must be tried by the law of England; but the law of
England says, that in a variety of circumstances with
regard to contracts legally made abroad, the laws of the
country where the cause of action arose shall govern.6
Thus, lex loci contractus as a choice of law rule was recognized and
applied in that case. Some of the jurists responsible for the formation of
conflict of laws rules, both in England and America, include J. Story, C.
Kent, A. V. Dicey, G. Cheshire, J. Westlake, and F. Harrison.'
II. PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA
Where then is Nigeria in this configuration of conflict of laws history?
As an independent nation on October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained its
sovereignty from British colonial rule.8 In 1914, the northern and southern
parts of the country, hitherto separately administered by British colonial
government, were amalgamated by Sir Frederick Lugard. Before
colonialism the amalgamated territories consisted of politically and legally
independent tribes. Earlier, about 1898, Flora Shaw, who later became
6. 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).
7. Works by these jurists include: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834);
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1873); THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Acollina et. al. eds.,
1993); PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (P.M. North & J.J. Fawcett eds., 12th ed.1992);
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (N. Bentwich ed., 7th ed. 1925), JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1919).
8. Nigeria Independence Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Elizabeth II, c. 55.
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Lady Lugard, had suggested in an article for The Times that the several
British protectorates on the Niger be known collectively as Nigeria.'
Long before the arrival of the British colonists on the territory now
known as Nigeria, and the subsequent colonization of the people thereof,
the geographical area now called Nigeria had been the abode of strong and
independent kingdoms. As Crowder put it:
Within its frontiers were the great kingdom of Kanem-
Borno, with a known history of more than a thousand
years; the Sokoto Caliphate which for nearly a hundred
years before its conquest by Britain had ruled most of the
savannah of northern Nigeria; the kingdom of Ife and
Benin, whose art had become recognized as amongst the
most accomplished in the world; the Yoruba Empire of
Oyo, which had once been the most powerful of the states
of the Guinea Coast; and the city-states of the Niger Delta,
which had grown partly in response to European demands
for slaves and later palm oil; the largely politically
decentralized Igbo-speaking peoples of the south-east, who
had produced the famous Igbo-Ukwu bronzes and
terracottas; and the small tribes of the Plateau, some of
whom are descendants of the people who created the
famous Nok terracottas."'
In Nigeria, the history of the legal science known as conflict of laws
has been largely neglected by the few Nigerian jurisprudential writers on
the subject." Their discussion of the subject starts from the date when
English law was received into Nigeria:' 2 1863 for Lagos and 1900 for the
rest of the country. No serious inquiry has been made on the position
before the reception statutes. Nigerian writers seem to content themselves
with an a priori conclusion that the Nigerian pre-colonial legal regime did
not have conflict of laws rules" and, by extension, such problems. It
seems therefore a Sisyphean task for the legal historian to attempt a
construction or exposition of conflict of laws in pre-colonial Nigeria.
9. M. CROWDER, THE STORY OF NIGERIA 11(1962) (quoting A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE,
WHO COINED THE NAME NIGERIA? (1956)).
10. CROWDER, supra note 9, at 11.
11. See generally I. 0. AGBEDE, THEMES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1989); A. YAKUBU,
HARMONISATION OF LAWS IN AFRICA (1999).
12. A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW 16-20 (1963).
13. AGBEDE, supra note 11, at 28; YAKUBU, supra note 11, at 25.
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Our initial survey of the general history of conflict of laws teaches us
that two factors must be simultaneously present before any issue of conflict
of laws can arise: social and economic interaction by people of different
sovereign states, and a diversity of legal regimes. The whole history of
conflict of laws is intertwined with these factors. Until people begin to
cross their national, state, local, or tribal boundaries and intermingle with
one another, there can be no foreign element in disputes. As Merrill
noted:
The introduction of steam power for purposes of
locomotion by sea as well as by land, and the employment
of telegraph wires and submarine cables, have led to a
marvelous increase in travel and commercial intercourse,
and to corresponding increase and complexity in the
relations existing between numerous individuals, and the
governments and laws of states other than their own. The
vast immigration from almost all parts of Europe to
America, with a view to permanent settlement and
naturalization, the establishment by thousands of
individuals of their residences in foreign countries without
any transfer of allegiance, and the extra-territorial
operations of numerous corporations, have given rise to
many interesting and important questions growing out of
the conflict of laws.14
The ius gentium in ancient Rome was the product of transnational
movements. Such movements, and the subsequent intermixture between
people of different legal backgrounds, gave birth to conflict of laws in the
Italian city-states of the fourteenth century and later in France, The
Netherlands, Germany, England, and the United States and Canada.
According to the recent authors of Cheshire and North: "The raison d'etre
of private international law is the existence in the world of a number of
separate municipal systems of law-a number of separate legal units that
differ greatly from each other in the rules by which they regulate the
various legal relations arising in daily life."" Pavel Kalensk ' echoed the
same sentiment:
It is generally known that most textbooks and systems raise
as the conditions of the origin and existence of private
international law on the one hand the fact that there exist in
14. GEORGE MERRILL, STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 1 (1886).
15. CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (12th ed. 1992).
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the world parallel to each other many sovereign states with
different legal systems and, on the other hand, that the
citizens of these states, who are non-sovereign subjects,
i.e., natural and legal persons, establish contacts and
relations of civil law [or family law], labour law or
procedural character. Of course, it should be seen that the
two aforesaid preconditions are far from being static and
that in the past decades they have undergone a very
dynamic development .' 6
Many questions arise in the application of the above principles to the
Nigerian situation: first, were there contacts and dealings between the
various independent primordial and pre-colonial Nigerian tribes? Second,
were those tribes regulated by different and divergent legal rules or
customary laws? Third, if the answer to both of the above is yes, then
how was the ensuing conflict of laws resolved? Here, we shall explore
possible answers to the above questions.
Within the northern part of Nigeria, there had flourished the Kanem-
Bornu Empire, the Sokoto Caliphate, and the Hausa states of Gobir,
Katsina, Rano, Daura, Kano, Zaria, Kebbi, Zamfara, Nupe, and Gwari.
There were intermingling, communication and contacts among these
groups. There was from earliest times intensified commercial intercourse
among these northern Nigerian kingdoms and states, and between them and
the outside world, especially with Algeria and Morocco through the Sahara
desert. The corollary was the introduction of Islam to the northern part of
Nigeria in about the eleventh century. According to Crowder:
West Africans participated eagerly in the growing trans-
Saharan trade, which brought them much needed salt from
the desert, as well as clothes, weapons, horses and beads.
The new states of the Western and Central Sudan also
traded among themselves. Kano cloth, for instance, was to
become much prized throughout the Western and Central
Sudan. One of the most extraordinary achievements of
these empires, from the accounts of Arab travelers, was
their maintenance of security of trading conditions over
vast areas of West Africa. Probably the most important
results of the Sahara trade were the penetration of the
Sudan by Islam and the introduction of writing. 7
16. PAVEL KALENSKY, TRENDS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (1971).
17. CROWDER, supra note 9, at 25.
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The introduction of Islam to the northern part of Nigeria meant the
regime of Islamic law,'" as both are axiomatically inseparable. Even today,
Islamic law is the personal law of Moslems in the northern part of
Nigeria.' 9 The common application of Islamic law in northern Nigeria left
no room for choice of law problems. The legal system was a monistic
one, analogous to the Unitary legal system in England, which, in the
formative stage of conflict of laws, frustrated the doctrine's growth and
development in that country.
Even before the introduction of Islam in northern Nigeria, about 1080
A.D.,2° trading contacts had existed among the various tribes in the
northern part of Nigeria, and between each of them and the outside world.
The trade was by means of barter. In this pre-Islamic period, one would
expect that the commercial intercourse amongst these northern Nigeria
tribes and the outside world must have engendered some conflict of laws
problems. However, that was not to be. The economic system of
exchange, i.e., barter, left little room for substantial disputes requiring
choice of law considerations.
There were also trading contacts between the tribes in the northern
region of Nigeria and the kingdoms of the forest in the southern part of
Nigeria, especially the Yoruba kingdom. According to a leading authority
on Yoruba history:
Light and civilisation with the Yorubas came from the
north with which they have always retained connection
through the Arabs and Fulanis. The centre of life and
activity, of large populations and industry was therefore in
the interior, whilst the coast tribes were scanty in number,
ignorant and degraded not only from their distance from
the centre of light, but also through their demoralizing
intercourse with Europeans, and the transactions connected
with the oversea slave trade -2
Crowder made the same point when he said that "[i]ndeed there is
strong reason to suppose that from an early stage Hausa and Yoruba traded
with each other."2 Again, the trade was by barter. As argued below, the
18. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTORY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
164 (A.O. Ikelegbe eds., 1995).
19. Usman v. Umaru, 7 NIGERIAN WKLY. L. REPS. 377 (Part 254) (1992).
20. That was the year a Kanem king, Mai Hume, converted to the Islamic faith. Islam was
introduced into the neighboring Hausa states in the fourteenth century.
21. SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF THE YORUBAS 40 (1921).
22. CROWDER, supra note 9, at 43.
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barter system did not yield disputes that warranted the application of
conflict of laws rules.
Thus far, the indigenous legal system, i.e., customary laws of these
tribes and kingdoms, had no occasion to ponder conflict of laws problems.
Economic activities carried on by a system of barter where, presumably,
the goods were exchanged on the boundary lines, and which could hardly
have given rise to substantial disputes in the area of conflict of laws. As
Diamond noted, "barter presupposes something of an objective standard of
values, a preliminary stipulation as to the form which the return is to take,
and an instantaneous return."21 The inability of this medium of exchange to
raise disputes which would have necessitated a discussion of choice of law
in pre-colonial Nigeria is evidenced by Diamond's postulation:
To sum up, the only commercial transactions of
importance, except among tribes who possess currency,
are ready barter and credit barter, and among the few
tribes who use currency, cash sale and loan of money are
added. There is little else. Of these transactions, ready
barter and cash sale produce little litigation.Y4
Thus, in the northern part of Nigeria, the barter system and the
subsequent unitary legal system resulting from the introduction of Islam
hindered growth and development for rules of conflict of laws.
However, this conclusion presupposes that the barter transaction went
on smoothly and successfully, that the parties involved in the exchange
were mutually satisfied with their bargains, and that no objections were
raised by any of them after the barter transaction. For instance, a Kano
man in pre-colonial Nigeria subject to Islamic law as his customary law
exchanged his horse for the gold of a Gao man in Western Sudan who was
subject to Gao customary law. The Kano man was happy with the gold
and the Gao man was happy with his horse. No dispute arose, and
therefore no question of whether Islamic law or Gao customary law was
applicable to that transaction arises.
However, if we complicate these facts, a lot of difficulties interpose.
Assume that the Kano man subsequently discovered that the gold he
received in exchange for his horse was not genuine, and that he felt
cheated and wanted his horse back. His Islamic law, in furtherance of our
assumption, allowed him to get back his horse in the circumstances. On
the other hand, the Gao man was not inclined to return the horse and relied
on his customary law which, for instance, provided that after an exchange
23. A.S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW 393 (1935).
24. Id. at400-01.
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of the goods in a barter transaction, the parties were automatically
discharged from any liabilities arising from the contract, and goods already
exchanged could not be returned.
The above facts face two conflicting systems of law: Islamic law and
Gao customary law. Also, the parties involved in the case were subject to
these two divergent legal systems. Whether the action was brought in
Kano or Gao, there would be the same question: which of the two systems
of customary law would provide the rule of decision? If the barter
transaction had taken place in a third tribal territory, e.g., the Yoruba
Kingdom of Oyo, the complexity would double because the question would
be whether it is the Yoruba customary law, Gao customary law, or Islamic
law that should govern the case. There is no doubt that the type of barter
we are analyzing is of a litigable nature and could raise questions within
the province of conflict of laws, i.e., the question of choice of law.
It is not clear how these pre-colonial tribes and kingdoms resolved the
type of questions raised by the above hypothetical case. In other words,
there seems to be no evidence that specific choice of law rules, or other
ascertainable rules of selection of the applicable law, were applied. The
absence of this evidence suggests that barter transactions giving rise to
litigable disputes must have been few in those pre-colonial times. This can
only be explained on the basis that the actual exchange in a barter
transaction must have been preceded by long and detailed negotiations
between the parties, during which they tried to ascertain the quality of their
individual goods, terms of exchange, and allowances for unexpected or
latent defects.
This level of circumspection and wisdom on the part of the traders is
expected, knowing that one or both of the traders involved in the barter
transaction might have come from a long distance that involved travel for
weeks or months. For instance, it was likely that the man from Gao
(present day Ghana in West Africa) must have traveled for several weeks
or months on the back of a camel, the only means of transportation at that
time, across the Sahara desert before getting to Kano (in the present day
Nigeria). It is therefore not unexpected that such a man would try to
obtain the most favorable bargain and take care of the most minute aspect
of the contract, especially with respect to latent defects in the articles of
exchange. For instance, if he reasoned that the horse might have a latent
disease, and that returning it after the barter exchange might be legally and
practically impossible because of the distance involved, he might decide
only to accept the horse in exchange for an inferior merchandise in his
store instead of his gold, and then take the horse as he found it.
The Kano man would likely operate on the same reasoning. He knew
that his customer came from Gao, a faraway land, and that getting back his
2001]
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exchanged horse, if things went wrong, might be practically impossible in
the circumstances. He would then take care to bargain in such a way that,
if the gold turned out to be fake, he would not lose completely. For
instance, he could subject the gold to the strictest examination and could
even hire local experts to examine it for him. If he had doubts he could
refuse to accept the gold in exchange. But if he decided to take the risk,
then he could accept the gold only in exchange for an inferior article of
his, other than his horse, and live with the consequences of his bargain.
The above type of circumspection naturally would leave little room
for litigable disputes arising from barter. However, where this level of
prudence was not exercised, the scenario changes and the problem of the
applicable system of law comes to the fore. We have already said that
there seems to be no evidence that any rules of selection of the applicable
law were applied by these tribes, but we can speculate that such disputes
might have been settled on the basis of the local law, i.e., the lexfori. In
other words, the court where the action was brought would apply the
customary law of the tribe to which that court belonged. This hypothesis
is based on the fact that in pre-colonial times, the legal systems of the
above tribes were elementary. The means of communication and travel
were at the rudimentary stage, mainly by horses and camels. In fact, the
camel was metaphorically called "the ship of the desert."
The judicial system was also basic. Some, like the Hausas and
Yorubas, had something like formal courts, while the Ibos lacked any
formal court structure and settled disputes democratically. These early
legal systems, without law reporting, juristic writing, or publication and
distribution of legal commentaries, coupled with the difficulties in
communication and travel, must have inhibited cross-fertilization of legal
ideas and were unlikely to have generated adequate knowledge of legal
systems obtainable in other tribes. Proof of other tribal or customary laws
must have been difficult, if not impossible, in the circumstances. Even in
modem times, judges do not envy legal situations requiring proof of a
foreign law.25 One can then guess how absurd it must have been to expect
25. In a situation that required an English judge to establish what was thp law of Spain on
a particular point, the judge lamented:
It would be difficult to imagine a harder task than that which faces me, namely, of
expounding for the first time either to this country or to Spain the relevant law of
Spain as it would be expounded by the Supreme Court of Spain, which up to the
present time has made no pronouncement on the subject, and having to base that
exposition on evidence which satisfies me that on this subject there exists a profound
cleavage of legal opinion in Spain and two conflicting decisions of courts of inferior
jurisdiction.
DUKE OF WELLINGTON, GLENTAR V. WELLINGTON AND OTHERS 515 (1947).
Nwabueze
a court of one tribe to establish by proof the customary law of another
tribe, probably in a faraway land.
Consequently, one would imagine that the court of each tribe applied
its tribal or customary law to disputes between a member of its tribe and a
foreigner or between one foreigner and another. That was the law with
which it was most familiar. Therefore, if such a local court ever assumed
jurisdiction in the matter, it would apply its tribal law. On this postulation,
one could generally say that litigable disputes arising from barter
transactions in the pre-colonial period must have been rare, and must have
been settled on the basis of the lexfori: the local law of the tribe in which
the action was brought.
The Ibos in the eastern part of Nigeria also had contacts with their
neighbors in the Middle Belt and the various city-states of the Niger Delta.
These contacts were mainly by way of trade carried on by barter.
According to Dr. Osmund Anigbo:
The Hausa\Yoruba traders can be regarded as the oldest
settlers in the Ibagwa community [Ibo tribe]. Oral
tradition traces the permanent settlement to the history of a
long war fought between Ibagwa Aka on the one hand and
a combined force of Obukpa, lheakpu Awka and Itchi on
the other. The Hausa and Yoruba tribes had been
frequenting the Nkwo market, bringing with them horses,
dried fish and talismen. The market offered palm oil in
exchange.26
On the relationship between the Ibos and the city-states of the Niger
Delta in the south southern part of Nigeria, Obaro Ikime stated, "The
mode of life of the Itsekiri people (one of the tribes on the Niger Delta) has
been determined by their environment. The Itsekiri are primarily
fishermen and, like their Ijo neighbours, are known as suppliers of fish and
'crayfish' to the peoples of the hinterland (i.e., the Ibos). "21 And Crowder
added that, "the Ijo traded with the peoples of the hinterland, who were
mainly Igbo and Ibibio . . . . The Ijo exported dried fish and salt, which
they panned in the salt water creeks, to the peoples of the hinterland, in
exchange for vegetables and tools, particularly those made of iron. "2
26. OSMUND ANIGBO, COMMENSALITY AND HUMAN RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE IGBO:
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF IBAGWA AKA, IGBOEZE L.G.A. ANAMBRA STATE NIGERIA 47
(1987).
27. OBARO IKIME, MERCHANT PRINCE OF THE NIGER DELTA 1 (1968).
28. CROWDER, supra note 9, at 60.
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As we have already noted, this type of trading contact based on the
barter system could not, generally speaking, generate conflict of laws
problems. However, this is subject to the misgivings expressed on the
litigable aspects of barter, based on the hypothetical case above.
Generalizing on the socialization pattern in pre-colonial Nigeria, Dr. Eteng
opined, "Periodic markets, themselves symbolizing the underdevelopment
of the pre-colonial distributive and exchange systems, provided occasions
for barter and information and diplomatic exchanges among contiguous
communities. "2
We can now posit that for problems of conflict of laws to arise from
inter-tribal or trans-boundary contacts, such contacts must be of such
quality and intensity as to affect personal or family status or profoundly
entail commercial contracts of a litigable nature. These factors were
seemingly absent in the tribal contacts we have so far examined. Kalenslo
rightly points out:
[I]n order for private international law to progress further,
it was necessary for the initial, sporadic contacts between
non-sovereign subjects subordinated to the laws of
different states and juridically exceeding the boundaries of
a single jurisdiction to grow to a certain level both
quantitatively and as regards the general and essential
character of such contacts for the life of society -10
Obviously, this required a level of contact lacking in pre-colonial
Nigerian societies. Because the prevailing economic system of barter
entailed an instantaneous exchange and gave little room for disputes, there
was no question, for instance, of a contract concluded in the Yoruba
kingdom between Hausa and Yoruba merchants being litigated in the local
courts of Kanem-Bornu or Benin Kingdom. However, this is only with
respect to simple barter transactions that were concluded successfully
without disputes thereafter.
Though we have reasoned above that most barter transactions in the
pre-colonial period must have belonged to this class, i.e., raised non-
litigable disputes, it is entirely possible that some barter transactions might
have given rise to litigable disputes. In that case, the analysis above on the
suggested method of solution is also germane here. There is no
authoritative evidence that at this period people from one tribe domiciled
or permanently resided in another tribe, e.g., a Yoruba man in the
29. I.A. ETENG, CHANGING PATrERNS OF SOCIALIZATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 348 (1980).
30. KALENSKO, supra note 16, at 29.
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thirteenth century or earlier taking up permanent residence in the Ibo area.
The insularity of the Nigerian pre-colonial tribal societies, the difficulties
in communication and travel, and the differences in language, manners,
culture, and political organizations, must have made inter-tribal residence
or settlement unattractive. As such, intercourse among pre-colonial
Nigerian tribes must have been superficial and transitory. Concomitantly,
the local jurists of these tribes never had the opportunity to ponder the
application of their local or customary laws to foreigners. Equally untested
was the resourcefulness of Nigerian customary laws in resolving cases with
foreign elements. However, one writer has confidently asserted, to the
contrary, that Nigeria's customary law has rules of conflict of laws:
The problem of choice of law arises in court where citizens
have relations or transactions with foreigners. It also
arises where this arises extra-territorially. The solution is
often found in established rules of conflict of laws or what
is sometimes called private international law. There is
even here a greater problem of this kind because
customary laws mainly vary from place to place and as
between families or kindred. There are however areas of
common ground. Nonetheless it cannot be suggested that
customary law is devoid or [sic] rules for solving issues of
conflict of laws-3'
This is quintessential a priori reasoning. Suffice it to say that the
analysis thus far challenges Onyechi's postulation. But he might well be
right with respect to some barter transactions that could actually give rise
to disputes, as shown in the above hypothetical case of a barter exchange
between a Kano man and Gao man.
However, Onyechi did not tell us how customary law resolved such
disputes with multi-tribal contacts. What were those customary law "rules
for solving issues of conflict of laws?" Is there any evidence of them?
These points were not addressed by him but, as already examined in detail,
insofar as litigable disputes arose from barter transactions it seems that
such disputes were settled by the customary law on the basis of lex fori. It
is for the reasons canvassed above that we agree with P.C. Lloyd's
conclusion:
With each Yoruba group claiming that its own customary
law differs from that of its neighbours there seems to be
31. AFRICAN INDIGENOUS LAWS 292 (T.O. Elias, S.N. Nwabara et a)., eds. 1974)
(proceedings of workshop held in Nsukka, Nigeria, on August 7-9, 1974).
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scope for conflicts of laws. In fact such conflict does not
seem to have arisen. This is partly because the alleged
differences in law between the traditional kingdoms refer
often to variant customs and not to any differences in the
basic legal system. Land cases are always heard by the
court within whose area of jurisdiction the land is situated
and they are judged according to the local law. It is
conceivable, though I recollect no case, that a stranger
might claim that in his home town a grant of land similar
to that he gained in his new settlement would confer
greater rights; but the rights granted to a stranger are those
usual in the grantor's town, and the stranger well knows
this. Cases involving the divorce or inheritance laws are
almost invariably taken by strangers to their home towns
for settlement. 2
It remains to add that the legal situation did not change even with
exploration of the River Niger and the emergence of the British merchants
on the coast of Nigeria about the sixteenth century, which led to trading
relationship between members of the coastal tribes of Nigeria and the
British traders. This relationship ultimately resulted in the political
subjugation of the Nigerian people.
III. CHRONICLE EVIDENCE FOR COMMERCE AND CONFLICTS
During the era of slave trade, which reached its peak about the
seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries, and its Victorian replacement
with legitimate trade, the British merchants maintained the economic system
of trade by barter. The implication of this system for conflict of laws in
Nigeria has already been noted, and justifies the lengthy quotation of James
Barbot, describing the operation of the barter system between the British
merchants and Nigerian coastal middlemen:
The king had on an old fashion'd scarlet coat, laced with
gold and silver, very rusty, and a fine hat on his head, but
bare-footed; all his attendants showing great respect to him
and, since our coming hither, none of the natives have
dared to come aboard of us, or sell the least thing, till the
king had adjusted trade with us.
32. P. C. LLOYD, YORUBA LAND LAW 26 (1962).
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We had again a long discussion with the king and Pepprel
his brother, concerning the rates of our goods and his
customs. This Pepprel, being a sharp blade, and a mighty
talking Black, perpetually making objections against
something or other, and teasing us for this or that Dassy,
or present, as well as for drams, etc., it were to be wish'd
that such a one as he were out of the way, to facilitate
trade ....
Thus, with much patience, all our matters were adjusted
indifferently, after their way, who are not very scrupulous
to find excuses or objections, for not keeping literally to
any verbal contract; for they have not the art of reading
and writing, and therefore we are forced to stand to their
agreement, which often is no longer than they think fit to
hold it themselves . . . . We adjusted with them the
reduction of our merchandize into bars of iron, as the
standard coin, viz: one bunch of beads, one bar .... The
price of provisions and woods was also regulated.
Sixty king's yams, one bar; one hundred and sixty slave's
yams, one bar; for fifty thousand yams to be delivered to
us. A butt of water, two rings. For the length of wood,
seven bars, which is dear; but they were to deliver it ready
cut into our boat. For a goat, one bar. A cow, ten or
eight bars, according to its bigness. A hog, two bars. A
calf, eight bars. A jar of palm oil, one bar and a quarter33
The last clause of the first paragraph above, "or sell the least thing,
till the king had adjusted trade with us," is explained by the detailed
examples which show that Barbot was not referring to conflict between the
customary laws of the Nigerian tribes on the coast and English law.
Barbot was just describing the nature of the barter transaction between the
English merchants and Africans, which a further passage from him will
illustrate.
Barbot's account herein generally shows that the trading system, if it
was limited to the type of instantaneous exchange implied in the passage,
was immune to commercial disputes of any litigable nature. This is
evident from the fact that actual exchange in the barter transaction referred
to by Barbot was preceded by days of negotiations during which every
33. James Barbot, An Abstract of a Voyage to New Calabar River or Rio Real in the Year
1699, in CHURCHILL: A COLLECTION OF VOYAGES AND TRAVELS 459-60 (3d ed).
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aspect and detail of the contract were mutually agreed by the parties.
Barbot recounted:
On the twenty fifth in the morning, we saluted the Black
King of Great Bandy, with seven guns; and soon after fired
as many for captain Edwards, when he got aboard, to give
us the most necessary advice concerning the trade we
designed to drive there. At ten he returned ashore, being
again saluted with seven guns; we went ashore also to
compliment the King, and make him overtures of trade,
but he gave us to understand, he expected one bar of iron
for each slave more than Edwards had paid for his; and
also objected much against our bafons, [sic] tankards,
yellow beads, and some other merchandise, as of little or
no demand there at that time.
The twenty sixth, we had a conference with the King and
principal natives of the country, about trade, which lasted
from three a-clock till night, without any result, they
insisting to have thirteen bars of iron for a male, and ten
for a female; objecting that they were now scarce, because
of the many ships that had exported vast quantities of late.
The King treated us at supper, and we took leave of him.
The twenty seventh the King sent for a barrel of brandy of
thirty five gallons, at two bars of iron per gallon; at ten we
went ashore, and renewed the treaty with the Blacks, but
concluded nothing at all, they being full of same mind as
before.
The twenty eight, we sent our pinnace up the river to
Dony, for provisions and refreshments; that village being
about twenty-five miles from Bandy. Transacted nothing
with Blacks of Bandy all this day.
The twenty ninth, had three jars of palm-oil, and being
foul weather, did not go ashore.
The thirtieth, being ashore, had a new conference which
produced nothing; and then Pepprell, the King's brother,
made us a discourse, as from the King, importing, He was
sorry we would not accept of his proposals; that it was not
his fault, he having a great esteem and regard for the
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Whites, who had enriched him by trade. That what he so
earnestly insisted on thirteen bars for male, and ten for
female slaves, came from the country people holding up
the price of slaves at their inland markets, seeing so many
large ships resort to Bandy for them; but to moderate
matters, and encourage trading with us, he would be
content with thirteen bars for males, and nine bars and two
brass rings for females. Upon which we offered thirteen
bars for men, and nine for women, and proportionably for
boys and girls, according to their ages; after this we
parted, without concluding anything farther.
On the first day of July, the King sent for us to come
ashore, we staid there till four in the afternoon, and
concluded the trade on the terms offered them the day
before; the King promising to come the next day aboard to
regulate it, and be paid his duties. 3'
The above apparently shows that Barbot was describing the trading
conditions of barter between the European merchants and African traders.
That transaction carried with it the potentiality of conflict of laws problems
because the two groups, Europeans and Africans, were subject to at least
two different systems of law. There is no doubt that disputes arising from
such transactions would have raised the question of choice of law: is it the
African system of law or the system to which the European merchants
were subject that would provide the rule of decision? But it seems that the
occurrence of the above type of problem or dispute was mitigated by the
detailed and lengthy negotiations that preceded the actual barter exchange.
With the type of transaction described by Barbot, in which the parties
mutually came to satisfactory terms before the actual exchange, disputes
which would have necessitated conflict of laws problems were practically
avoided. If the entire barter transaction on the Nigerian coast was carried
on solely on the basis of Barbot's description, i.e., with mutually accepted
negotiated terms followed by instantaneous exchange of goods, one would
have been tempted to conclude that conflict problems did not arise.
However, things did not remain entirely as Barbot described. He gave
another side of the barter transaction: credit barter, which was full of
potentialities for conflict of laws problems.
According to Barbot, the European merchants gave credits in the form
of goods to the African Kings and merchants. The Africans paid back the
34. Id. at 459.
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credit with slaves and other commodities needed by the Europeans. The
credit system existed probably to facilitate trade and ensure that the
European merchants spent less time on the African coast; with the credits
the Africans would keep the slaves and other goods ready before the
Europeans made a return trip. Barbot described the credit system:
We also advanced to the King, by way of loan, the value
of a hundred and fifty bars of iron, in sundry goods; and to
his principal men, others, as much again, each in
proportion of his quality and ability.
To captain forty, eighty bars. To another, forty. To
others, twenty each.
This we did, in order to repair forthwith to the inland
markets, to buy yams for greater expedition; they
employing usually nine to ten days in each journey up the
country, in their long canoes up the river.3
The questions then become: did the Africans pay back the credits or
fulfil their own obligations under the credit barter? If not, how did the
European merchants react or enforce payments? If so, did the method of
enforcement generate disputes? How were those disputes settled? Which
legal system was applied to the settlement of such disputes? Barbot's
account did not answer most of the above questions, but he described the
method of repayment:
It is customary here for the King of Bandy to treat the
officers of every trading ship, at their first coming, and the
officers return the treat to the King, some days before they
have their compliment of slaves and yams aboard.
Accordingly, on the twelfth of August, we treated the
King, and his principal officers, with a goat, a hog, and a
barrel of punch; and that is an advertisement to the Blacks
ashore, to pay in to us what they owe us, or to furnish with
all speed, what slaves and yams they have contracted to
supply us with, else the King compels them to it. At that
time also such of the natives as have received from us a
present, use to present us, each with a boy or girl-slave in
requittal. According to this custom we treated the Blacks
ashore on the fifteenth of August, and invited the
35. Id. at 460.
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Portuguese master to it, as also the Black ladies; the King
lending us his musick, to the noise of which we had a long
diversion of dances and sports of both sexes, some not
unpleasing to behold ....
On the twenty second, we let fly our colours, and fired a
gun, for a signal to the Blacks, of our being near ready to
sail, and to hasten aboard with the rest of the slaves, and
quantity of yams contracted for23
Barbot has just described the custom by which the Africans paid back
their loans or discharged their own obligations under the credit barter
transaction. According to him, the African King ensured that the African
merchants paid back their loans and in fact enforced repayment in that he,
"compels them to it." That is clear.
But what of the loan given to the African King himself? How was
repayment by the King enforced and by whom? Where the African King
refused to pay back his loan and a dispute naturally resulted, what law was
applied to the resolution of that dispute? Barbot did not give any clue to
the answers for the above questions. His silence on the point may well
mean that the African King himself was not found wanting in repaying his
own loan. Otherwise, he would have recorded such an important event
which would have had the effect of disrupting trade and adversely affecting
the relationship between the European and African merchants. One thing
seems to be clear: disputes which resulted or would have resulted from
such credit transactions involving people from different legal and political
backgrounds obviously belonged to the field of conflict of laws. As we
shall see later, the frequency of similar disputes in the nineteenth century
led to establishment of a special type of court called "the court of equity,"
not in any way connoting the Chancery Court in England which developed
its principles of equity.
Again, during this era, the British merchants merely conducted their
transactions on the Nigerian coast without any settlement or intention to
settle in the Nigerian territory. This is particularly true in the early
periods of their presence in Nigeria, i.e., about the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. The African land, its peoples and cultures, were strange to
them. Malaria resulting from mosquito bites ensured a very high mortality
rate on the part of the foreigners. This was such a serious impediment to
settlement that most parts of West Africa, including Nigeria, were
euphemistically called the "white man's grave." It was not until the
36. Id. at 463.
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British merchants started residing in Nigeria on a more permanent basis,
probably following the discovery of the malaria prophylactic chloroquine
in the early nineteenth century, that serious and full disputes of a conflict
of laws nature began to arise.
Trade disputes between Nigerian merchants and British traders led to
the latter's call to their home government for help and protection. The
British government reacted by appointing a first British Consul, John
Beecroft, to Nigeria in 1849. He was himself a British merchant and
already familiar with the trade and politics of the Niger Delta.3 ' The
consul's primary duty was to protect the lives and property of the British
traders.m We shall presently discuss how the conflicts between the British
and Nigerian merchants were settled.
Having described, as the primary evidence allows, the extent and
effect of social and economic interaction in Nigeria to the period of the
arrival of European traders, mainly British, the next step is to establish the
existence of the diversity of tribal or customary laws in pre-colonial
Nigeria.
IV. CUSTOMARY LAW AND SYSTEMS
There is no doubt that each of the various pre-colonial Nigerian tribes
had, and still has, its own tribal, native, or customary law which
exclusively applied to it, and was different in some ways from the
customary legal system applicable in another tribe. Even today one speaks
of Yoruba customary law, Ibo customary law, and the Islamic law that is
applicable in the northern part of Nigeria. According to Justice A.G.
Karibi-Whyte, "the various customary laws are indigenous to the ethnic
groups and were formulated by them to meet the different social challenges
in their development over the ages. Islamic law does not enjoy the same
natal origin, and like English law is exotic."3' Similarly, then-Justice Dan
Ibekwe stated extra-judicially:
In the beginning, the various communities which made up
what is today known as Nigeria were developing in their
own simple ways. It is however, correct to say that . . .
those communities were not integrated as is the case now.
In the process of time, each community had evolved into
37. IKIME, supra note 27, at 14.
38. Id.
39. A. G. KARIBI-WHYTE, THE RELEVANCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE POLITY-IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 31 (1987).
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an organized society. Each had its customary law and, in
many cases, there were sanctions behind such law.'0
Since different social, political and even religious structures obtained
in these tribes, the customary laws emanating therefrom were bound to
diverge. As Yntema put it:
In early times, when the legal order was intimately
connected with actual or supposed kinship groups and was
part of the peculiar religious and social structure of the
particular community, law was inalienably personal. It
was inconceivable, for example, that the ius civile, the
common law of the Roman citizenry, should be available
to a peregrine in Rome or, vice versa, that an Athenian in
Attica should claim the protection of some barbarian
custom. This identification of local law with the interests
of the social group has by no means disappeared."
Similarly, Ezra Zubrow opined that "[t]his universality of legal
systems is probably matched only by their diversity. They range from
systems based on kinship to property, from secular to religious principles,
and from consensual to dictatorial impositions. Different societies have,
differing mixes at various times."' 2  Finally on this point, Professor
Nwabueze has stated, "It should be explained that customary law is not a
single body of law throughout the country. Far from that being the case,
customary law is as various as the number of independent communities
comprised in Nigeria.-, 3
It should be emphasized that the existence of a multiplicity of tribal or
customary laws in pre-colonial Nigeria, and the exclusive application in a
tribe of its customary law, did not generate legal pluralism. Legal
pluralism implies the simultaneous existence and interaction of two or
more different systems of law, one of which is superior to the others." In
pre-colonial Nigeria, where the customary law of a tribe was the only
40. D. 0. Ibekwe, Conflict of Cultures and our Customary Law, in AFRICAN INDIGENOUS
LAWS 297 (T.O. Elias, S.N. Nwabara et al., eds. 1974) (proceedings of workshop held in
Nsukka, Nigeria, on August 7-9, 1974).
41. Hessel. E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP.
L297, 298 (1953).
42. THE IMPACT OF FOLK LAW ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EARLY STATE, paper from
the 11th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Canada 334
(1983).
43. B. 0. NWABUEZE, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN NIGERIA 3 (1963).
44. M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM 6 (1975).
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applicable law, the question of interaction with or subservience to any
other law did not naturally arise.
Although the pre-colonial Nigerian societies had their different
customary laws, i.e., existence of legal diversity, the emergence of conflict
problems of choice of law depends on the view one takes of the apparently
superficial social and economic interaction, and on the impact of the barter
based economic system. In other words, if one takes the view that the
barter system actually led to disputes, that is a strong argument for the
existence of conflict of laws problems at that period; but a contrary view of
barter may mean that conflict of laws problems did not exist. We have
already examined both perspectives. However, whatever dispute arose, be
it between individuals from different tribes or between natives and
European traders, it was settled in a clearly identifiable pattern and without
reference to any judicial process.45
This naturally takes us to the last question: what was the mode of
resolution of disputes, if any, arising from inter-tribal contacts? The first
approach will be to tackle the mode of dispute resolution before the advent
of Europeans. Thereafter, we shall examine the style of dispute resolution
in the colonial era.
The argument here on dispute resolution in pre-colonial Nigeria is
without prejudice to the earlier suggestion that the lex fori was likely
applied to disputes of a conflict of laws nature. The following is in the
nature of an alternative argument. In pre-colonial Nigeria, disputes that
resulted from the superficial inter-tribal contacts were not referred to any
adjudicatory body. This might have been due to the ethnic and tribal
nature of the different customary laws. During this period, violence was
usually and freely resorted to in the settlement of such disputes. Few
references will suffice. Professor Obaro Ikime stated:
The development of the palm oil trade had another effect
on Itsekiri-Urhobo relations. Although through the system
of pledges and 'diplomatic marriages' it was often possible
to maintain friendly relations between the middlemen and
the producers, disputes between the Urhobo and the
Itsekiri were not always resolved peacefully. Sometimes
the Itsekiri traders, offended by the non-fulfillment of
promises made by their Urhobo customers sent their
slaves, usually described as their 'boys' to raid the villages
of the offenders concerned; the idea was that slaves taken
45. For traditional judicial process, see E.K. Quashigah, Reflections on the Judicial
Process in Traditional Africa, 4 NIGERIAN JURIDICAL REV. 1 (1990).
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during such a raid would, by working f or the Itsekiri,
eventually make good the loss sustained by the non-
fulfillment of the obligations previously agreed on. Once
under way such raids tended to become indiscriminate,
since the 'boys' did not always confine their depredations
to specific individuals or villages. This practice usually
referred to as 'chopping' was to be frowned upon by the
British administration in the years after 1891 .4'
Violence and self-help as dispute resolution methods were
characteristic of "primitive" law. They were equally employed by the
Greeks, as Vinogradoff noted:
As frequently happens in ancient law, distress was used as
a means of obtaining justice by self-help. Another feature
of the procedure was that distress or reprisals are not
necessarily directed against one's opponent, but might be
leveled against relatives of his or even against his
countrymen at large. Such cases were considered as a
justified taking of hostages."
Gluckman added that "[iun polysegmentary societies there may be no
authoritative means of settling disputes between opposed segments and
hence there is resort to vengeance or self-help. "43
The advent of colonialism, at least initially, did not alter the above
mode of dispute resolution. The Europeans naturally refused to submit to
legal regulation by customary law, which was considered alien. However,
Nwabueze submitted: "At first these foreign traders resorted to the
traditional tribunals for the settlement of their disputes with the natives. "4
No authority was cited for this proposition. What he said could have been
true of Canada, but definitely not Nigeria. The Canadian position has been
stated by Bradford W. Morse: "There is in fact a wealth of information
indicating that early travellers, traders and colonists willingly chose to
accept local Indian law as governing their affairs in the Canadian
46. IKIME, supra note 27, at 7.
47. P. Vinogradoff, Historical 7ypes of International Law, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
PAUL VINOGRADOFF 260 (1928).
48. M. GLUCKMAN, IDEAS AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 69 (1969).
49. NWABUEZE, supra note 43, at 46.
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Prairies. "" Certainly this was not the position in Nigeria, because the
prevailing barter system entailed instantaneous' return which, generally
speaking, hardly generated litigable dispute.
Again, this point is substantiated by the account of James Barbot:
"they [Africans] have not the art of reading and writing, and therefore we
are forced to stand to their agreement, which often is no longer than they
think fit to hold it themselves." 52 Thus, with this unequal bargaining
power, the question of resort by the European traders to the customary
laws or traditional tribunals did not arise and could not have arisen.
Professor Crowder clearly made the same point:
The palm-oil traders were as rough a lot as the old slave
traders, and well deserved their title 'palm oil Ruffians.'
The African chiefs could not actually bring these traders
before their own courts, so they resorted to the expedient
of imposing collective punishment on the European
community through the banning of trade. This was fairly
effective, since conditions on the coast were such that most
traders were very anxious to get back to Europe as quickly
as possible, and could stomach no delays. The ban on
trade was always absolute because of the strict control
African chiefs exercised over their subjects. There was no
'scabbing' on the African part, to use a modem trade-
union term. On the other hand, the Europeans found it
difficult to combine effectively, since whenever a
European community stuck out for lower prices, there was
usually one of their number willing to trade at the
African's price .53
The imperative of some form of adjudicatory body to resolve disputes
between African and European traders did not arise until the latter began to
settle on a more permanent basis in the larger territory that became
Nigeria. Consequent upon this settlement, disputes between Nigerian and
British merchants increased. These disputes were clearly of the nature of
conflict of laws since they naturally involved the question of which legal
system, English or customary law, was applicable. Because the British
50. INDIGENOUS LAW AND STATE LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT AND COMPATIBILITY,
COMMISSION ON FOLK LAW AND LEGAL PLURALISM, paper from the 11th Int'l Congress of
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Canada 334 (1983)
51. DIAMOND, supra note 23, at 393.
52. BARBOT, supra note 33, at 459-60.
53. CROWDER, supra note 9, at 123.
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merchants were reluctant to employ the traditional process of dispute
resolution, they appealed to their home government for help. This, as we
have already noted, led to the appointment of the first consul, John
Beecroft, whose primary responsibility, was the protection of the lives and
property of British traders in the Niger Delta.
The various consuls did not apply any judicial form of inquiry or
technical rules of justice. Rather, they resorted to intimidation and
violence against the Nigerian traders whenever there was a dispute between
them and their British counterparts. The modus operandi of the British
consul was graphically captured in the account of Ikime:
But while he [John Beecroft] was actually in the district,
the people of the town of Bobi, led by their chief Tsanomi,
attacked and looted Horsfall's factory. The cause of the
attack is not known but, judging from subsequent
incidents, it is unlikely that it was undertaken out of sheer
desire for loot. Beecroft was filled with great indignation.
In a note to the naval authorities, he requested that a
gunboat be sent to the Benin River to mete out condign
punishment: 'the sooner a man of war arrives the more
pleasing it will be for me, for these scoundrels must be
well chastised with powder and shot.' This was
characteristic. Beecroft was determined to leave no doubts
as to the power and authority which the consul could bring
to bear on these perennial disputes between white traders
and the delta peoples. The gunboat requested did arrive,
and Beecroft proceeded to bombard and burn down Bobi,
thereby establishing the pattern of Afro-British relations in
this as in other parts of the delta: whenever a dispute arose
between British traders and the delta middlemen, the latter
had almost invariably to face punishment irrespective of
the rights and wrongs of the casei'
No doubt, dispute settlement based on gunboat diplomacy hindered
trade, and even social intercourse between Africans and Europeans. Both
parties set out to find a formula for the resolution of such disputes with
traces of foreign elements. This search resulted in establishment of a
"Court of Equity" in 1854 for the adjudication of disputes between
Africans and Europeans. It was composed of African middlemen and
European supercargoes, the "foreign traders" as they were known, and
presided over by the latter in monthly rotation. Its judgment was
54. IKIME, supra note 27, at 15-16.
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confirmed by the African king." The Court of Equity was described by
Dr. Baikie, who explored the River Niger up to Lokoja in Nigeria:
A commercial or mercantile association was, by the
exertions of captain Witt and others formed, the members
being the chief white and black traders in the place, and
the chair is occupied by the white supercargoes in monthly
rotation. All disputes are brought before this court, the
merits of the opponents are determined, and with the
consent of the king, fines are levied on defaulters. If any
one refuses to submit to the decision of the court or
ignores its jurisdiction, he is tabooed, and no one trades
with him. The natives stand in awe of it, and readily pay
their debts when threatened with it.1'
Disputes before the Court of Equity obviously had a foreign element
and were most likely to have involved the question of choice of law. Was
it English law or African customary law that would provide the rule of
decision? However, the Court of Equity did not decide disputes before it,
based on any ascertainable pattern or system of law. Rather, it based its
decisions on general notions of justice.'
The emergence of these courts of equity in various parts of Nigeria
after 1854, though they entertained problems in the nature of conflict of
laws, did not lead to the introduction of a full system of conflict of laws or
its rules in Nigeria. This is because the Court of Equity did not decide
disputes before it on the basis of choice of law, i.e., by asking which of
the potentially applicable laws would provide the rule of decision. It was
historically in the nature of pure equity, as employed in the English court
of Chancery, that the judge's "conscience" ruled according to reason and
fairness.
On 30 July 1861, King Dosunmu of Lagos ceded Lagos to Acting
Consul McKoskry, in return for a yearly payment of one thousand and
thirty pounds sterling. Consequently, a governor was appointed for the
newly-acquired colony of Lagos in the person of Henry Stanhope Freeman.
This appointment marked the beginning of a permanent British colonial
administration in Nigeria. Obviously, an administration of this nature
required a complete legal system for effective operation. This led to the
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introduction of English law in the colony of Lagos in 1863,-" subsequently
extended to the rest of the country. 9 By the Supreme Court Ordinance of
1863,60 the first Supreme Court was established for the colony of Lagos.
This Ordinance was subsequently repealed and replaced with the Supreme
Court Ordinance of 1876.61 This statute received into the colony of Lagos
the common law of England, the doctrines of equity, and statutes of
general application in force in England on 24 July 1874.
In 1900, both northern and southern Nigeria were declared British
protectorates and a Supreme Court was established for each.6 The
common law of England, doctrines of equity and statutes of general
application in force in England on 1 January 1900 were received into each
protectorate. The reception of English law was continued and confirmed
by many statutes passed after Nigeria's independence.3
Thus, the reception of English law into the colony of Lagos in 1863
and the rest of the country in 1900 marked the introduction in Nigeria of
complete and mature rules of conflict of laws derived from England.
V. CONCLUSION
This legal historical reconstruction has concentrated on the state of
conflict of laws in Nigeria from the pre-colonial period to establishment of
full British administration in Nigeria in 1863. The existence of conflict of
laws during this period can be mirrored from the barter economic system
and was conditioned by it. There were two arguments on the impact of
barter: first, that barter was preceded by such circumspection, prudence
and detailed negotiation that disputes of a conflict of laws nature which
might have arisen were practically averted; and second, that the barter
system, especially the credit barter, actually resulted, or was likely to have
resulted, in disputes which belonged to conflict of laws. Disputes which
came before the court of equity in the nineteenth century were clearly of a
conflict of laws nature. To the extent that conflict of laws problems
existed during the period under review, there was no clear evidence of the
rules which were adopted in the resolution thereof. Apart from the
58. Ordinance No. 3 of 1863.
59. A.N. Allott, The Common Law of Nigeria in Nigerian Law: Some Recent
Developments, in A REPORT FROM THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INT'L AND COMP. L. 31(1964).
60. Ordinance No. 11 of 1863.
61. Ordinance No. 4 of 1876.
62. Supreme Court Proclamation No. 6 of 1900 (for Southern Nigeria), and Protectorates
Court Proclamation No. 4 of 1900 (for Northern Nigeria).
63. Nigerian Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Alloysius Olumba Agunanne (1995) 5 NIGERIAN WKLY.
L. REPS. 541, 580-81 (Part 397) (decision of Supreme Court of Nigeria).
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traditional settlement by war; reprisals; gunboat diplomacy; and reference
to the Court of Equity, which did not apply any systematic body of
principles or rules, disputes of a conflict of laws nature were likely settled
by application of the lex fori, because of the peculiar difficulty of proving
foreign law during that period.
We conclude that a full system of conflict of laws, as we know it
today, was introduced into Nigeria in 1863. The primary evidence for
conflict of laws in Nigeria during the colonial period, which are still valid
sources today, were the reception of English common law, doctrines of
equity, and statutes of general application.
